Identify the statement that does not challenge Robert Arrington's argument that because marketing doesn't prevent us from renouncing our pre-existing and independent choices, our desires for them must be considered autonomous.
Select one:
a.
Gerald Dworkin's point that if an individual does not or cannot rationally reflect on a first-order desire (one he or she just happens to have at any time), then the fact that he or she doesn't renounce it does not prove conclusively that it is an autonomous desire.
b.
Dworkin's further claim that autonomy is a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically on first order preferences and the capacity to accept or change them in the light of higher order preferences and values.
c.
Roger Crisp's claim that we need to know why a first-order desire is accepted, and if not renounced, if it is indeed independent from, say, advertising.
d.
Even if some consumer choices are not autonomous, nothing in Dworkin's or Crisp's analysis shows that advertising is responsible for violating autonomy, only that some consumers do not act in a fully self-conscious way.