A buyer and seller trade with each other for an infinite number of periods. Both parties have a discount factor of d, where 0 < d < 1. In each period both parties can play trust (T) or to play selfish (S). If both the buyer and seller play T the payoffs are 4 to each player. If both parties play 5 the payoffs are 3 to each player. If one player plays S and the other T. the payoffs are 7 to the player who opted for S and 1 to the party that opted for T. Consider the following trigger strategy. In the first period play T. In any subsequent period, play T if in every previous period the outcome was (T, T), if not play S. What is the minimum d required for this trigger strategy to be subgame perfect equilibrium? O 1/3 O 1/4 O None of the other answers are correct. O 3/4 O2/3
